HS2020122

斯坦福大学

哲学终身教授

Professor of Philosophy Emeritus

 该教授是斯坦福大学哲学终身教授. 他在语言哲学，形而上学和心灵哲学领域为哲学做出了重大贡献。他以在情境语义，反身性，索引性，个人身份和自我知识方面的工作而闻名。

他 1978 年的著作 A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality 通过对话的方式探讨个人身份理论中的标准问题， 其形式在对话中将不同的哲学立场与不同的人物联系起来， 与 David Hume 经典 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 相似。

1v1 科研

结合八年来在美国顶级名校的深耕布局，ASC 在全美国拥有超 500 位常春藤盟校及行业顶尖排位的终身教授的人才库。针对全球学生在各科系、各院校、各时间段的需求点，做到无缝对接，按照学生的具体要求，量身定制符合学生特色需求的科研项目，真正实现兴趣与大师的完美契合。

ASC 名师一对一并非传统的授课模式，而是由教授根据学生的科研兴趣点，量身定制一个属于学生自己的独立科研课题，并且通过 1 次的试探性阅读与交流，确立学生的科研兴趣点，再通过 1-2 次的研讨，确立科研的论题，2 次的研讨确立论题的论据，最后产出科研论文。这个过程中，学生与教授会实现无缝沟通，由教授直接给学生布置相关科研内容的课题阅读，帮助学生进一步深化他对科研内容的理解。

ASC 名师一对一是目前全球唯一由美国顶级名校终身教授全程亲自执教带领，以激发学生主动性科研，实现完全由学生自发完成的独立科研课题项目。

时间：任意时间段，滚动开班

· 根据学生情况任意安排，线上科研

· 总直播授课时间为 15 小时。

· 由教授授课总时间为 5 小时，五周完成。

· 每周授课 1 小时。授课中，教授主要讲解科研的方法与学科切入的重点，布置相应的阅读，促进学生思考，由学生下课后进行独立研究探索。

· 由哥伦比亚大学写作教授组织超小型论文辅导课为 10 小时。

· 预计学生所花费的独立科研总时长：45 小时。

· 教授与学生一对一联系，进度由教授直接把控。

· 同时配备一个学习顾问全程安排学习工作与论文产出进度。

产出：

Ÿ 教授根据学生科研项目出具量身定制版本的推荐信。

Ÿ 学术论文，可定制学术期刊发表。

Research Interests：

He has made contributions to many areas of philosophy, including logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. His 1978 book A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality deals with standard problems in the theory of personal identity in the form of a dialogue between a mortally wounded university professor, Gretchen Weirob, and her two friends, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen. The views represented include those of Bernard Williams, John Locke, and Derek Parfit. The format of associating different philosophical positions with different characters in a dialogue recalls David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

In 1979, he published "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" in which he combined his work on philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Essential indexicals (I, here, and now) are parts of language that cannot be paraphrased away. They are seen as locating beliefs and are essential to understand the speaker's belief.

 Areas of Expertise：

Philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind

Topics Covered： 'Borges and I' and 'I'

In Jorge Luis Borges’ (very) short story, “Borges and I,” one character, referred to in the first person, complains about his strained and complex relation with another character, called “Borges.” But the characters are both presumably the author of the short story. This study tries to use ideas from the philosophy of language to explain how Borges uses language to express complex thoughts, and then discusses two interpretations of the story.

 Moore’s Paradox

G. E. Moore famously noted that saying ‘I went to the movies, but I don't believe it’ is absurd, while saying ‘I went to the movies, but he doesn't believe it’ is not in the least absurd. The problem is to explain this fact without supposing that the semantic contribution of ‘believes’ changes across first- person and third-person uses, and without making the absurdity out to be merely pragmatic. We offer a new solution to the paradox. Our solution is that the truth conditions of any moorean utterance contradict its accuracy conditions. Thus we diagnose a contradiction in how the moorean utterance represents things as being; so we can do justice to the intuition that a Moore-paradoxical utterance is in some way senseless, even if we know what proposition it expresses.

 Squaring the Circle

Making the distinction between semantics and pragmatics has proven to be a tricky task, leading to several problems that look like Gordian knots, or worse; perhaps semantics and pragmatics are so tangled that separating them is impossible, like squaring the circle. In a nutshell, pragmatic inference both requires and is required by the determination of what is said. Thus, there is no way

to unravel semantics and pragmatics. In this paper, we will show how to square Grice’s circle. We untie the semantics/pragmatics knot, without using any of Alexander’s methods: slicing it with a sword or removing the (semantic) pin around which it was bound. The approach consists in assuming a minimal but truth-conditionally complete notion of semantic content, which doesn’t constitute what is said by the utterance, but does provide the required input for pragmatic reasoning.

 Selected Publications:

Books

Ÿ 1978. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Ÿ 1983. Situations and Attitudes. With J. Barwise. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Ÿ 1993. The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays_. New York: Oxford University Press. (Enlarged edition, Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000.)

Ÿ 1999. Problems d'Indexicalité_. Selected essays translated by J. Dokic and F. Preisig. Stanford and Paris: Editions CSLI: 1999.

Ÿ 1999. Dialogue on Good, Evil and the Existence of God_. Cambridge/Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Ÿ 2001. Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness_. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Ÿ 2001. Reference and Reflexivity_. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 2nd edition, 2011.

Ÿ 2002. Identity, Personal Identity and the Self_. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Articles

Ÿ 2009. Diminished and Fractured Selves. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok and Peter V. Rabins (Editors) Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ÿ 2009. Subjectivity. In Brian P. McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press: 223-238.

Ÿ 2009. Directing Intentions. In Joseph Almog and Paulo Leonardi (eds), _ The Philosophy of David Kaplan_. Oxford University Press, 2009:187-202.

Ÿ 2009. Hintikka on Demonstratives, Revue internationale de philosophie 4 (2009) , 250: p. 369-

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Ÿ 2009. Hume and Frege on Identity. (Book Symposium on Donald Baxter, Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise.) Philosophical Studies, 146: 413-423.

Ÿ 2010. What is Said. Recanati, Stojanovic and Villanueva (eds), Context Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton-DeGruyter. (With Kepa Korta)

Ÿ 2010. Velleman: Self to Self. Nous, 44:4:1-19.

Ÿ 2010. Persons and Selves. In Béatrice Longuesness, editor, Le Moi/The Self/Le Soi, special number of Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, October-December 2010 No. 4.